In rendering decisions, courts sometimes cite obiter dicta passages found in the texts of expert opinions of previous cases, with or without recognition of the status of obiter dicta of the quoted passage. A quoted passage from obiter dicta may be part of the decision in a later case, depending on what the latter court actually ruled and how that court dealt with the principle set out in the quoted passage.  obiter dictum, Latin for „what is said in passing,“ a flippant statement. In particular, in the law, it refers to a passage of a judicial opinion that is not necessary for the resolution of the dispute pending before the court. Such statements have no precedent, but can still be important. Thus, it may be concluded by emphasizing that obiter dictum is an opinion not required for a judgment and is a legal opinion of a judge in the course of proceedings, but is not necessary for his decision and therefore has no binding effect; This is also a „remark“. It is the ratio decidendi that has the binding effect and the previous one. From a technical point of view, in addition to the finding of essential facts, a decision may result from two bases, one ratio decidendi and the other obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi of a judgment can be defined as the principles of law formulated by the judge to decide the question before him, while obiter dicta means observations of the judge that are not essential to the decision taken. It is a Latin phrase that means something that is said casually or randomly. Obiter probably useless for the decision, can be the expression of a point of view or feelings that have no binding effect. Obiter dictum is the Latin expression meaning „other things said“, that is, a remark in a judgment that is „said in passing“. This is a concept derived from English common law, according to which a judgment consists of only two elements: ratio decidendi and obiter dicta.
That is another part of any judgment. In Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan, obiter dictum is defined as the opinion expressed by the judge of the court or at the time of delivery of the judgment, which has no bearing on the decision. It is not an important part of decision-making, but it is only used to describe circumstances. These are the incidental remarks made by the court when dealing with the actual conflict between the parties. In Sarwan Singh Lamba v. Union of India, the Supreme Court noted that, in general circumstances, even the obiter dictum mentioned in a court decision should be followed. Moreover, the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court carries considerable weight. However, this weighting depends on the nature of the dictum pronounced by the court.
If the dictum is a casual remark of the court, it will affect the parties or subsequent cases. In another scenario, some obiter dicta have a recommendatory or persuasive value, but do not bind anyone. Therefore, the ratio decidendi is an important part of the judgment and not an obiter dicta. Over the years, many questions have been raised and much has been written on the subject, which determines obiter dicta et ratio decidendi. Since then, jurists have debated this, and there has not been a single concrete conclusion, but neither has it given us the freedom and space to interpret this maxim at will. However, it clarifies our doubts and confusions and warns us against certain errors and traps in which we can fall with regard to obiter dicta and ratio decidendi. What remains to be clarified is an eternal question – can there be a final decision on what obiter dicta and ratio decidendi are and can it be easily distinguished in the judge`s decision? It is also necessary to examine how lawyers, lawyers and judges can, at least halfway, understand this decision-making maxim. It is safe to say that if we broaden our horizons in this regard, it will certainly turn the tide of the century and be a tool for future judges of the legislative branch. What we are talking about here is that it is incumbent upon a judge and a lawyer or jurist to use his or her sense of reasoning not superficially, but at the root, to understand the nature or foundations of a subject. And if this is to happen, it is important that they acquire the necessary knowledge on the subject and that our understanding of this subject is thorough and solid. This is where the biggest mistake is made in distinguishing between Obiter Dicta and Ratio Decidendi. It is the lack of in-depth knowledge and clarity on this subject that we fall into a trap.
If we consider obiter dicta and ratio decidendi to be part of stare decisis, we expect it to be a simple principle that should be used by a judge when deciding the case by referring to other jurisprudence, and therefore too much weight is given to precedents as they are, we forget or we simply do not know. Or tend not to look beyond precedent as they are and dive into their broader spectrum of how it could be shaped without changing its nature, and we also tend to lose sight of the fact that it doesn`t have to be a classic definition of what a judge can decide on a given principle. In other cases, the obiter dicta may propose an interpretation of the law which has no bearing on the present case, but which could be useful in future cases.  The most notable example of such an event is the story of the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938), which, while opposing the use of the due process clause to block most laws, suggested that the clause could be used to remove laws dealing with „fundamental rights“ issues. It is generally believed that this obiter dictum led to the doctrine of rigorous examination (and subsequently intermediate examination) in cases of racial, religious and sexual discrimination, first enunciated in Korematsu v. the United States (1944). Korematsu v. The United States itself was condemned by the same court in obiter dictum in Trump v.
Hawaii (2018). If a court decides that it does not have jurisdiction to hear a case (or dismisses the case on the basis of a formality) but nevertheless issues opinions on the merits, these opinions may constitute obiter dicta.